According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. Selves are not something that endures over time. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." AN ANALYSIS OF "ONWE" (SELF)Onwe roughly means the self; this is the main subject of identity and it perdures all human experience. 31 likes. ― Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. In 2009 Metzinger published a follow-up book to Being No One for a general audience: The Ego Tunnel (Basic Books, New York, ISBN 0-465-04567-7). Selves are not part of reality. Metzinger proposes the existence of a “model” of the self, and suggests that there is not self because this model is only a model, not an actual self. The paper extends the work on Self — Model Theory or SMT (introduced by Metzinger, 2003) by introducing concepts of the first-person perspective and representationalist analysis of self … He argues that the phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process: it is the content of a 'transparent self-model.' The self is in many respects – contra Metzinger – a real entity, to the same degree as a table is. Thomas Metzinger, in his most recent book, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, describes the self—presumably the area of psyche in which my patient experienced her distress—as existing in a state of inwardness or operating within the internal properties of the person. One way to reconstruct his underlying no-self argument (according to Metzinger, 2003, 2009) runs as follows: (1) Experiencing the self is a construct of … This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Metzinger: Nope, there’s no ‘self’ ... Thomas Metzinger: The first thing to understand, I believe, is that there is no thing like “the self.” Nobody ever had or was a self. According to Okere, "It is not describable and has no name and no function except as the ultimate author of all the functions of the individual, the carrier of all experience. Like “Yes, there is an outside world, and yes, there is an objective reality, but in moving through this world, we constantly apply unconscious filter mechanisms, and in doing so, we unknowingly construct our own individual world, which is our "reality tunnel It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. Being No One is a substantial work by German philosopher Thomas Metzinger about “consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective.” Its main thesis “is that no such things as selves exist in the world. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. Nobody ever was or had a self.” I have spent some time with the book, making, from its 634 densely-printed pages, 104 pages of notes. In his remarkable book Being No One, Thomas Metzinger defends a representationalist and functionalist analysis of the first-person phenomenal experience of being a self.1 According to Metzinger, the phenomenal self – i.e., the experience of oneself as a conscious subject with a first person perspective – is no more than an appearance